Global Watch | How Pakistan Deep State Targeted Afghan Taliban, And It Is Payback Time Now

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Bilateral relations between the Pakistani establishment and the Afghan Taliban have rapidly deteriorated in recent years, primarily due to Islamabad’s accusations that Kabul shelters the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

People inspect damage, at the site of a suicide bomber attack, on the day of Friday prayers, at an Islamic seminary in Akora Khattak, Pakistan February 28, 2025. (Reuters)
People inspect damage, at the site of a suicide bomber attack, on the day of Friday prayers, at an Islamic seminary in Akora Khattak, Pakistan February 28, 2025. (Reuters)

In the wake of the Jaffar Express hijack incident, which was a huge embarrassment for the Pakistani establishment, and a rise in attacks on Pakistani security forces in both Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan has been trying to project itself as a victim of terrorist groups backed by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. But the fact is that it is Pakistan’s deep state that has targeted Afghanistan, leading to the ‘payback’ from the latter.

On 28 February 2025, Pakistan witnessed a further demonstration of its ongoing struggle with terrorism, as a suicide bombing resulted in six fatalities and left 20 others injured. What sets this attack apart, however, is its location and the targeted individual, within the broader context of insurgent violence and Pakistan’s regional policy stance. The suicide bombing targeted Maulana Hamidul Haq, the Vice Chancellor and leader of Jamia Darul Uloom Haqqania, who was killed in the attack. The lack of an immediate claim of responsibility from any terrorist or sectarian group has prompted speculation about the potential involvement of Pakistan’s deep state. This becomes particularly significant in light of the growing rift between the Pakistani establishment and the Afghan Taliban.

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    However, why would such speculation regarding the possible involvement of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in this high-profile assassination arise in the first place? The conjecture is rooted in the long-standing and historically symbiotic relationship between Darul Uloom Haqqania and the jihadist networks that have supported Pakistan’s strategic depth doctrine since the 1980s. The ideological and operational links of the Haq family, particularly in nurturing terrorist networks, can be traced back to the Afghan jihad against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, during which Pakistan, under President General Zia-ul-Haq, took on the role of the principal architect of an anti-communist insurgency framed within the rhetoric of ‘jihad.’

    Founded in 1974 by Maulana Abdul Haq in Akora Khattak, a town in Pakistan’s north-western Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Darul Uloom Haqqania adheres to the Hanafi-Deobandi school of thought, which enjoys substantial support among the Pashtun population across the Durand Line. During the 1980s, the seminary became a prominent hub for the religious indoctrination of Afghan refugees as well as hundreds of foreign terrorists, aligning closely with Pakistan’s geostrategic objective of fostering and weaponising jihadist proxies. The institution’s crucial role in sustaining this terrorist network led to its reputation as the ‘University of Jihad’. This role continued well after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, as Pakistan redirected its battle-hardened terrorist assets to other insurgency theatres, most notably Kashmir, to combat India.

    The seminary’s alumni include some of the most prominent terrorist figures, such as key leaders of the Afghan Taliban, including Amir Khan Muttaqi, Abdul Latif Mansoor, Maulvi Ahmad Jan, Mullah Jalaluddin Haqqani, Maulvi Qalamuddin, Arifullah Arif, Mullah Khairullah Khairkhwa, and Zabiullah Mujahid, among others. Of particular importance is the seminary’s profound ideological and operational influence on the Haqqani Network, one of the most powerful factions within the Afghan Taliban. The current leadership, headed by Sirajuddin Haqqani, who serves as the Interior Minister of the Afghan Taliban government and one of the three deputies to its Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada since the group regained power in August 2021, was raised within the influence of this seminary. This ongoing pattern of jihadist support, deeply ingrained within Pakistan’s security strategy, makes the growing rifts between the Pakistani establishment and the Taliban movement a crucial lens through which the targeted assassination of Maulana Hamidul Haq should be examined.

    It is worth noting that Hamidul Haq, a former parliamentarian and current leader of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (S) political faction, assumed leadership of the family-run Darul Uloom Haqqania in 2018 following the assassination of his father, Maulana Sami-Ul-Haq. The elder Haq, a prominent jihadi ideologue, influential religious figure, and political leader who had served in Pakistan’s parliament, was fatally stabbed at his residence in Bahria Town, Rawalpindi—a high-security area housing the Pakistan Army’s headquarters and other critical defence infrastructure. Sami-Ul-Haq was instrumental in the ideological radicalisation of Darul Uloom Haqqania and its role as a breeding ground for jihadist militancy; he was often referred to as the “Father of the Taliban".

    Remarkably, the circumstances surrounding his death remain unclear, even years later, as Pakistani investigative authorities have been unable to identify the perpetrators or establish responsibility. This notable lack of progress has sparked speculation about the potential involvement of state-aligned actors, considering Sami-ul-Haq’s undeniable role as a crucial intermediary between the Pakistani establishment and the jihadist network, particularly in relation to the Afghan Taliban.

    In addition to taking over the leadership of Jamia Haqqania, Hamidul Haq also inherited his father’s politico-religious roles, establishing himself as a pivotal intermediary in Pakistan’s intricate dealings with the Afghan Taliban. In this role, he led a delegation of Pakistani religious scholars in high-level discussions with the Taliban leadership in February 2024, ostensibly to “address the mistrust" amid the rising geopolitical tensions between Islamabad and Kabul.

    Bilateral relations between the Pakistani establishment and the Afghan Taliban have rapidly deteriorated in recent years, primarily due to Islamabad’s accusations that Kabul shelters the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a Pakistani terror group ideologically aligned with the Taliban that has carried out numerous high-casualty attacks on Pakistan’s security forces. Against the backdrop of a resurgent insurgency spanning from Balochistan to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Pakistani state has adopted an increasingly aggressive stance towards Afghanistan, exemplified by recent cross-border airstrikes, an interventionist action strongly condemned by both the Taliban regime and their Pakistani sympathisers. In contrast to Islamabad’s coercive military approach, Jamia Haqqania has denounced the securitisation of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, instead advocating for diplomatic rapprochement and conflict de-escalation.

    As hostilities between the Pakistani establishment and the Afghan Taliban intensified, figures such as Maulana Hamidul Haq strongly condemned Islamabad’s coercive actions. In his final Friday sermon before his assassination, he delivered a direct condemnation of the Pakistani military and its intelligence agencies, accusing them of orchestrating a coordinated disinformation campaign against the Taliban. As demonstrated in widely circulated footage, he addressed his congregation of thousands with steadfast defiance, declaring: “We do not fear martyrdom. We are fully aware of your malicious intentions against us. If Hamid is martyred, he will regard it as a great honour before Allah and His Prophet (PBUH)." He further issued a scathing critique of the Pakistani state, stating: “I will never forgive the blood of our children shed by the Pakistani Army and its intelligence agencies—just as I will never forgive the assassination of Maulana Samiul Haq."

    The provocative nature of these statements, made just moments before his assassination, lends support to the theory that his killing may have been an inside job orchestrated by elements within the Pakistani military establishment, possibly intended as a coercive tactic to apply pressure on the Taliban and force strategic compliance. This hypothesis has been implicitly supported by the Afghan Taliban’s official condemnation of Hamidul Haq’s assassination. Their statement suggests that the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), which has become a significant security threat to the Taliban’s interim government, seemed to have been used as a proxy by Pakistan’s security apparatus to carry out the suicide attack.

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      In this context, by orchestrating such an attack, Islamabad may have aimed to destabilise and demoralise the Taliban movement, further exacerbating the already precarious dynamics that characterise Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. This incident also highlights how the Pakistani military establishment has strategically utilised religious institutions and figures to serve its broader regional objectives.

      The writer is an author and a columnist. His X handle is @ArunAnandLive. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18’s views.

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