Opinion | The Prabowo Pivot: How Indonesia's Strategic Shift Benefits India
Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s visit, strategically timed and swiftly following on the heels of his engagements with both China and US late last year, carries significant weight
Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s presence as the chief guest for India’s 76th Republic Day is more than just a ceremonial gesture. He engaged in serious bilateral discussions with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, addressing critical regional and global issues.
This visit, strategically timed and swiftly following on the heels of Prabowo’s engagements with both China and the United States late last year, carries significant weight. Traditionally, newly elected Indonesian leaders have prioritised visits to their ASEAN neighbours, a diplomatic custom he has conspicuously sidestepped.
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This deviation is not a mere anomaly; it signals a profound shift in Indonesia’s foreign policy outlook hinting at a nation ready and, perhaps compelled, to assert itself on the global stage. The question now is not whether Indonesia can walk this newly charted path, but rather how and to whose strategic benefit, particularly India’s, this walk will proceed under Prabowo’s leadership.
DEPARTURE FROM REGIONAL ORTHODOXY
Prabowo’s administration is not simply tinkering at the edges of Indonesian foreign policy, it is initiating what his foreign minister Sugiono has termed a “bold and innovative" turn. This is not mere rhetoric.
A closer examination of Jakarta’s recent diplomatic actions reveals a deliberate recalibration away from its long-held ASEAN-centric approach. For decades, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) has been the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy with the country often perceived as the bloc’s de facto leader.
Prabowo’s campaign speeches, however, notably omitted any significant mention of ASEAN – a telling detail in itself. His first state visits to Beijing and Washington, before even a substantial engagement with ASEAN partners, underline this shift in priorities.
The postponement of a formal ASEAN meeting, replaced by an “informal" engagement with Malaysia, and Sugiono’s absence from crucial ASEAN consultations on Myanmar, further underscore a discernible downgrading of ASEAN’s centrality in Indonesia’s strategic calculus. Indeed, some analysts within Indonesia itself are beginning to question whether this new direction signifies ASEAN being placed “on hold", as Indonesia looks towards grander, global horizons. This departure, while perhaps necessary for Indonesia’s burgeoning ambitions, raises pertinent questions about regional stability and the future of ASEAN cohesion.
Further, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), historically a significant component of Indonesia’s foreign policy identity, also appears to be undergoing a reassessment under Prabowo. While Sugiono referenced the Bandung Conference, the bedrock of NAM, in his recent policy address, the manifesto of Prabowo’s own Gerindra party dismisses NAM as an “outdated relic of history".
This internal contradiction raises serious questions about the future direction of Indonesia’s engagement with the movement. In a geopolitical landscape increasingly defined by great power competition, Prabowo seems to be prioritising a more pragmatic, power-centric approach.
INDIA AND INDONESIA: CONVERGING STRATEGIC INTERESTS
Against this backdrop of Indonesian foreign policy recalibration, Prabowo’s scheduled state visit to India takes on an added significance. This visit, following trips to Beijing and Washington, underscores Prabowo’s focus on major power diplomacy over regional engagement.
This very focus presents a unique opportunity for India. Historically, India and Indonesia have shared a complex, often under-realised, strategic partnership. Both countries, giants of the NAM, have long espoused principles of multilateralism and peaceful coexistence.
Shifting geopolitical sands, however – particularly the assertive rise of China – are forging a new convergence of strategic interests between Delhi and Jakarta. India, like Indonesia, is increasingly wary of China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
The common strategic interests and concerns particularly regarding China’s ambition, provide a solid foundation for enhanced cooperation. Both countries recognise the imperative of maintaining a balanced regional order, one that is not dominated by any single power.
Prabowo’s apparent pivot towards major power engagement, while potentially diluting ASEAN centrality, could paradoxically create space for a stronger bilateral partnership with India, predicated on shared concerns and a mutual desire for a multipolar Asia.
The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signed in 2018, now takes on a renewed significance. This partnership, initially aimed at economic and security collaboration, can be the bedrock upon which a deeper strategic alignment is built.
India, with its Act East Policy and Indo-Pacific vision, finds in Prabowo’s Indonesia a potentially willing and able partner. The question is whether both nations can seize this moment.
UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF DEFENCE, MARITIME COOPERATION
The maritime domain represents a crucial arena for enhanced India-Indonesia cooperation. Both nations are significant Indian Ocean powers, sharing concerns about maritime security and freedom of navigation, especially in the face of China’s growing naval assertiveness.
The existing Defence Agreement since 2018, with its pledges for increased strategic consultations and joint military exercises, must be proactively leveraged. Joint patrols in the Indian Ocean, already a reality since 2002, need to be intensified and expanded in scope. Indonesia’s experience with Chinese incursions in the Natuna Sea offers a stark lesson in the realities of dealing with Beijing’s expansive maritime ambitions.
In addition, Prabowo’s background as a former defence minister suggests a predisposition towards prioritising security and defence considerations in foreign policy. His appointment of Sugiono, a party ally, as foreign minister, signals a potential shift in foreign policy leadership, possibly towards the Istana Palace, further underscoring the President’s personal interest and direction in this domain.
This focus on security, combined with Indonesia’s strategic location and India’s growing defence capabilities, creates a fertile ground for a more robust and impactful defence partnership, one that could contribute significantly to regional stability and balance of power.
NAVIGATING THE TIGHTROPE: CHALLENGES AND CAUTIONS
Despite the promising signs, the path ahead is fraught with complexities. Prabowo’s “bold diplomacy", while potentially beneficial for India, introduces an element of uncertainty into regional geopolitics.
Indonesia’s attempt to balance relations with both the US and China, while understandable, is a tightrope walk. The US has softened its stance towards Prabowo, indicating a pragmatic acceptance of his leadership. However, navigating the intensifying US-China rivalry, especially with the potential return of a Trump presidency, will be exceptionally challenging for Jakarta.
While Prabowo aims to avoid alienating either power, it could become increasingly precarious in an era of intensifying US-China rivalry. India must be acutely aware of Indonesia’s strategic calculus and avoid any perception that a closer India-Indonesia partnership is aimed at containing or confronting China directly.
Such a perception could be counterproductive, potentially pushing Indonesia back towards a more cautious and less assertive foreign policy stance. While Prabowo’s focus on global power dynamics might benefit India in certain respects, it also carries the risk of further marginalising ASEAN.
A weakened or internally divided ASEAN would not serve India’s long-term strategic interests in Southeast Asia. India has consistently championed ASEAN centrality and regionalism, and it must ensure that a closer bilateral partnership with Indonesia does not inadvertently undermine these broader regional frameworks.
Delhi needs to engage proactively with Jakarta to ensure that Prabowo’s global ambitions are not pursued at the expense of regional stability and ASEAN cohesion. For India, the challenge lies in effectively engaging with Prabowo’s Indonesia, ensuring that the burgeoning bilateral relationship translates into concrete strategic gains, particularly in the defence and maritime sectors. The opportunity is present, but capitalising on it demands astute diplomacy and a clear understanding of the shifting sands of Indonesian foreign policy under Prabowo.
A WATERSHED MOMENT OR A FLEETING OPPORTUNITY?
Prabowo’s state visit to India arrives at a critical juncture in regional geopolitics. It represents a potentially transformative shift in Indonesia’s foreign policy, one that could have far-reaching implications for the Indo-Pacific.
For India, this shift presents a unique opportunity to forge a deeper and more consequential strategic partnership with a key regional player. However, realising this potential will require careful navigation, strategic foresight, and a nuanced understanding of Indonesia’s evolving foreign policy priorities.
This visit could indeed be a watershed moment, marking the beginning of a new era of India-Indonesia strategic alignment. But it could also prove to be a fleeting opportunity, lost amidst the complexities of great power competition and regional uncertainties.
The onus is now on both Delhi and Jakarta to seize this moment, to translate converging strategic interests into concrete actions, and to build a robust and enduring partnership that serves not only their own national interests, but also the broader cause of peace, stability, and a balanced order in the Indo-Pacific. The stakes are high, and the time to act is now.
Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18’s views.
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