Opinion | Modi’s Water Diplomacy: Transforming Scarcity Into Regional Stability

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Last Updated:March 21, 2025, 16:44 IST

In a region where water is increasingly becoming a zero-sum game, Modi’s proactive, strategic water diplomacy offers a glimmer of hope – a path to transform scarcity not into conflict, but into a catalyst for regional stability and enduring peace

PM Modi's approach is not born from abundance, but rather from a stark recognition of India’s precarious water future. (PTI photo)

For all of human history, water has been one of the most vital and widely used resources. From early settlers along rivers to great ancient civilisations such as the Indus Valley, Mesopotamia, and the Incas, all flourished by establishing themselves near water bodies. Thus, it is no surprise that water and rivers continue to play a crucial role in fostering relations and advancing diplomacy in the 21st century. Under the leadership of Narendra Modi, India has recognised this reality with unprecedented acuity, transforming water management from a domestic challenge into a sophisticated instrument of foreign policy, deftly balancing the looming threat of scarcity with the urgent need for regional stability.

PM Modi’s approach is not born from abundance, but rather from a stark recognition of India’s precarious water future. A nation housing 17 per cent of the world’s population, yet possessing a mere 4 per cent of its freshwater reserves faces an undeniable crisis. This inherent scarcity, compounded by inefficient historical water management, has driven a paradigm shift.

Modi’s vision is proactive, not reactive; it views water not as a source of conflict waiting to erupt, but as a conduit for cooperation, and when necessary, a lever for assertive diplomacy. This is a government that understands that in a water-stressed world, control over this resource translates to tangible geopolitical power.

WATER AS A STRATEGIC TOOL

For decades, India’s approach to transboundary water resources, particularly in relation to its neighbours, was largely reactive, often hindered by legalistic interpretations and bureaucratic inertia. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) with Pakistan, while lauded for its longevity, exemplifies this. Though designed to ensure equitable water sharing, its rigid framework—conceived in a vastly different geopolitical era—has struggled to adapt to contemporary challenges. Modi’s arrival marked a decisive break from this inertia. He recognised water’s strategic value, understanding that in a water-stressed region, control and judicious allocation of this vital resource could be a powerful tool.

Water was then leveraged to recalibrate India’s relations, utilising its geographical and hydrological position to foster cooperation while, crucially, securing its own national interests. The stark pronouncement after the Uri attacks in 2016—"Blood and water cannot flow together"—was not just rhetoric; it was a clear articulation of a new doctrine. Water diplomacy was now intrinsically linked to national security, marking a departure from decades of compartmentalised approaches.

RECALIBRATING THE INDUS

The most audacious aspect of Modi’s water diplomacy lies in his approach to the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) with Pakistan. For decades, the IWT was treated as sacrosanct—an untouchable cornerstone of fragile Indo-Pakistani relations. However, Modi’s government has shown a willingness to challenge the status quo, initiating moves to “modify" the treaty. This was justified by Pakistan’s persistent objections to Indian hydroelectric projects and the drastically changed circumstances since 1960, including climate change and escalating water scarcity.

Of the 18,653 MW of power generation potential from these rivers, India has so far commissioned only 3,264 MW (18 per cent). Additionally, while India has permission to irrigate 1.34 million acres of land, it is currently utilising only 0.792 million acres.

This recalibration is fraught with risks, given the deep-seated mistrust and historical baggage that plagues Indo-Pakistani relations. However, it also presents a strategic opportunity. By asserting its rights under the treaty—rights that India has historically underutilised, particularly in relation to hydropower generation on the western rivers—India can subtly exert pressure on Pakistan, especially in the context of continued cross-border terrorism.

The completion of projects like the Baglihar Dam, despite Pakistani objections, and the ongoing construction of others on the Chenab, signals India’s intent to exercise its water rights more assertively. Additionally, the completion of the Shahpur Kandi Barrage on the Ravi River, which stops excess water from flowing into Pakistan, further signifies a strategic shift in water management.

When India filled the Baglihar reservoir, Pakistan reportedly suffered a 30 per cent crop loss, demonstrating the economic impact of India’s control over the rivers. Several more projects on the Chenab, including the Pakkaldul, Lower Kalnai, Sawalkot, Rattle, and Bursar dams, are currently in the pipeline. Once completed, these projects will enable India to generate approximately 62 per cent of the potential 18,600 MW of power from the western rivers.

The shift in India’s stance also marks Modi’s assertive diplomacy, driven by national security concerns linked to terrorism. It underscores India’s strategic use of water as a diplomatic tool while asserting its rights under the Indus Waters Treaty. This move is expected to benefit the Jammu and Kashmir region by enabling irrigation for 4,000 acres of agricultural land. Notably, the dam’s construction was completed after nearly three decades since its foundation was laid.

Many critics argue that by doing so, India is weaponising water, a symbol of life. However, on the contrary, India is merely exercising its rights and ensuring water security for its own citizens. The Indus Waters Treaty was a product of its time, brokered under the influence of Cold War geopolitics. Under its terms, India was granted access to only about 20 per cent of the total water covered in the pact, while 80 per cent was allocated to Pakistan. This was because the western rivers carry significantly more water than the east-flowing ones. Six decades later, the challenges facing India and Pakistan have evolved. The changing terms of the treaty are reflective of the same.

COOPERATION WITH BANGLADESH, NEPAL AND BHUTAN

However, much like water itself, Modi’s water diplomacy moves with ebb and flow. It is not merely a tool for gaining leverage but also a means to enhance cooperation and foster meaningful relationships. Nowhere is this more evident than in India’s engagements with Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan.

The protracted Teesta River water-sharing negotiations with Bangladesh, spanning over a decade, perfectly encapsulate both the complexities of the issue and the Modi government’s approach. While a definitive treaty remains elusive—stalled by the internal political dynamics of West Bengal—the Modi government has sustained dialogue, demonstrating its commitment to finding a mutually acceptable solution. Bangladesh depends heavily on the Teesta’s waters for agriculture and consumption, while Mamata Banerjee has argued that sharing the river’s water with Bangladesh would severely impact lakhs of people in north Bengal.

This persistent engagement, despite domestic hurdles, signals a long-term strategic vision—prioritising regional harmony even when immediate gains are limited.

Furthermore, the robust hydro-cooperation with Nepal and Bhutan stands as a shining example of Modi’s proactive water diplomacy yielding tangible regional benefits. The numerous hydropower projects in Bhutan, significantly funded and supported by India, are not merely about energy generation; they are about fostering enduring economic interdependencies, goodwill, and regional energy security. Bhutan’s hydropower sector, which accounts for a staggering 63 per cent of its total exports, is fundamentally intertwined with India’s support and consumption.

By doing so, the Modi government has created a win-win situation for both India and Bhutan. Similarly, the Mahakali Treaty with Nepal, though facing its own implementation challenges, signifies India’s commitment to engaging in complex, long-term water resource management projects for mutual benefit, incorporating hydropower generation and flood control.

Nepal obtained the right to use a minimum of 1,000 cubic feet per second (cusecs) of water in the summer season and a maximum of 150 cusecs in the winter season from the Sarada Canal. However, it began maximising these resources through the Mahakali Irrigation Project only after its completion in 1997.